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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
;

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.20000071-CA

vs.
:
:

SEAN THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1999).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is unconstitutional

on its face and as applied?

A constitutional challenge to a

statute presents a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness.

State v.

Mohi,

901 P. 2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995).

Moreover, this Court should apply ''strict scrutiny" to this case
as it impacts freedom of speech as located in the and First
Amendment.

See, St. George

v.

Turner,

1993) .

Page 1

860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201
(1) A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject
to prosecution in the jurisdiction where the telephone call
originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or
frighten any person at the called number or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, the person:
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues;
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not
a conversation ensues, or after having been told
not call back, causes the telephone of another to
ring repeatedly or continuously;
(c) makes a telephone cal and insults, taunts, or
challenges the recipient of the telephone call or
any person at the called number in a manner likely
to provoke a violent or disorderly response;
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or
profane language or suggests any lewd or lacivious
act; or
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to
inflict injury, physical harm, or damage to any
person or the property of any person.
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor.

United States Constitution, Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for redress of grievances.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
....No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of
life liberty or property, without due process f law; nor
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
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Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15
No person shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Sean P. Thompson appeals from a bench trial conviction of
Telephone Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated §76-9-201, as adopted by Provo City.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information
with Telephone Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in Fourth
District Court, Provo Department.
On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield.

After testimony from the alleged

victim, the responding officer, and Thompson, the Court ruled in
favor of the City of Provo and convicted

Thompson of telephone

harassment. On December 20, 1999, Thomson was sentenced to 15
hours of community service and a $250 fine.

On January 19,

2000, Thompson filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District
Court.
\

\

\
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified
that Thompson called numerous times within the hour.(Tr. At 7 ) .
Thayer testified that she asked Thompson to cease his phone
calls.(Tr. At 8)

The responding police officer, Bastian,

testified that while he was at the home of Thayer investigating
the telephone calls, Thompson again called, wherein Bastian
picked up the receiver and spoke with Thompson.(Tr. at 13).
Bastian requested to meet with Thompson at Thompson's home.(Tr.
at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson's home Bastian indicated that
he smelled alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer.(Tr. at
14) .
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a
telephone call from Thayer and she told Thompson that she was
going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly harm Thompson's
daughter.x (Tr. at 17 & 20). Thompson testified that he called
Thayer numerous times because he feared Thayer was a danger to
herself and to Thompson's daughter.(Tr. at 21). Thompson
repeatedly called Thayer because he was taught in school to keep
calling to assist the person threatening suicide.(Tr. at 20).

The alleged victim and Thompson were recently divorced and are parents of a daughter.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since the Utah Court of Appeals has declared applicable
sections of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 unconstitutional,
Thompson asks that this Court reverse the conviction.

The facts

of this case provide standing for Thompson to challenge the
telephone harassment statute's constitutionality.

The telephone

harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial
deterrent effect on protected speech and a court's narrowing
construction of the statute is not possible.

Because the statute

is overbroad and vague it must be stricken down because it
violates the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution as well as Article I, §§ 7 and 15
of the Utah Constitution.

Given the above the telephone

harassment statute cannot be applied to Thompson or anyone else.
ARGUMENT
THOMPSON'S CONVICTION OF TELEPHONE HARASSMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED BECAUSE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-9-201
HAS BEEN DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED
Recently this court has ruled on the issue of Utah Code
Annotated §76-9-201 in Provo
1 P.3d 1113, (Ut. App. 2000).

City

v. Whatcott.

In Whatcott,

Provo

v.

Whatcott,

this court ruled that

provisions within Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 are overbroad,
Id. at 6.

A statute that is determined to be unconstitutional on

its face must be stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the
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statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Provo
Corp.

v. Willden,

Huber,

768 P.2d at 459(Utah 1989J; Logan

786 P.2d at 1377(Utah App. 1990).

City

City

v.

Given this court's

recent ruling, which is on point, Thompson's conviction should be
reversed.
I. In General
Speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Utah
Constitution.2
A.

Standing
A defendant has

NN

general standing" when he can show "

x

some

distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute.' " Willden,
(quoting Jenkins

v. Swan,

768 P2d. at 456

675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)).

Thompson was convicted under Utah's telephone harassment statute
demonstrating he "indisputably has standing to challenge the
ordinance, at least as it has been applied to him."

Willden,

768

P.2d at 457.
Thompson also has standing to challenge the statute on
its face as to the statute's constitutional validity. A statute
may be held facially invalid even if it can be applied

2

Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in part "No law shall be passed to
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech ...." and has been interpreted as granting at least as
much protection as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.. KUTV, Inc. v.
Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983).
Page 6

Logan

legitimately in the facts of this particular case.
Huber,

786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990).

City

v.

Upon a determination that

the statute is unconstitutional on its face the statute must be
stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the statute to be
Willden,

applied against Thompson or anyone else.
459; Huber,

768 P.2d at

786 P.2d at 1377.

Generally, a person may not challenge the facial validity of
a statute on grounds that it may conceivably be applied
State

unconstitutionally to others not before the court.
Haig,

578 P. 2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978).

v.

However, this is not so

when we are dealing with First Amendment protections.

The First

Amendment overbreadth and vagueness standing doctrines represent
a departure from the traditional rule.

The doctrines are

designed to give standing to anyone who is subject to an
overbroad or vague statute that chills the exercise of First
Amendment rights of others.
521, 92 S.Ct.
457.

Gooding

v.

Wilson,

405 U.S. 518,

1103, 1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408; Willden,

768 P.2d at

The doctrine "gives a defendant standing to challenge a

statute on behalf of others not before the court even if the law
could be constitutionally applied to the defendant/'
City

v. Lopez,

Bigelow

v.

Salt

Lake

935, P.2d 1259, 1263 n. 2 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997); See

Virginia,

421 U.S. 809, 816, 95 S. Ct. 222, 2230, 44

L.Ed.2d 600 (1975); Broadrick

v.

Oklahoma,

413 U.S. 601, 612, 93

S. Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State
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v.

Haig,

578 P.2d

837, 840 (Utah 1978).

The rationale for this exception is that

the First Amendment rights infringed upon are so important that
their protection need not wait for the perfect litigant.
Willden,

768 P.2d at 457.

Hence, a defendant does have standing

to challenge the statute on grounds of both

unconstitutional

overbreadth and vagueness as applied to others.
U.S. at 521, 92 S. Ct. at 1105.

Gooding,

405

When faced with First Amendment

overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute, this Court should
first address overbreadth.

Logan

City

v.

Huber,

786 P. 2d 1372,

1375 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).
B.

Overbreadth
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or

ordinance aims at penalizing an unprotected class of speech, it
"must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of
application to protected expression/7
92 S.Ct. at 1106; See Huber,

Gooding,

786 P.2d at 1375.

405 U.S. at 522,
The

constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech do not allow the
government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes
of speech/'

Huber

786 P.2d at 1374.

An overbroad enactment is

one " x which does not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the press.' vv
Page 8

Huber,

786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill

v.

Alabama,

310 U.S.

88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)).
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is
determined by analyzing two factors: (1) Whether the statute's "
^deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and
substantial;' : and (2) Whether the statute is * readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts.' " State
578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznlk
Jacksonville,

v.

City

v.

Halg

of

422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed,2d

125(1975)).

If the statute's deterrent effect on protected

expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by state courts then
it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
1.

Substantial Deterrent Effect.

Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and
substantial deterrent effect on protected speech.

For example,

the statute precludes one from making a telephone call with
intent to "alarm" another.

The deterrent effect of this language

on constitutionally protected speech has no limits.

This

overbroad choice of words conceivably makes it criminal in Utah
to call one's neighbor and warn him that his house is on fire, or
to call a friend and forecast an approaching storm.
v. People,

541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col.

1975) (en banc).
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See

Bolles

The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call
with intent to "annoy" another.

There are many instances where

one may call another with the intention of causing a slight
annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected
purposes.

Conceivably, this statute could make criminal a single

telephone call made by the following individuals: a consumer who
wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a
produce or service; a businessman disturbed with another's
failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen who
wishes to complain to a public official; an individual bickering
over family matters; or a creditor seeking to collect payment of
a past due bill.
(111.

See

People

v.

Klick.

362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32

1977).
The term "harass"3 as used in the statute is merely a

persistent annoyance and should be considered on the same
guidelines as "annoy". Conceivably, this statute could make
criminal repeated telephone calls made by the following
individuals: a consumer who wishes to express dissatisfaction
over the performance of a produce or service that continues to
fail after being repaired.

Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle

such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a consumer who
expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a

3

Meriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, "Harass - lb - annoy
persistently."
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businessman disturbed with another's failure to perform a
contractual obligation after being told once of the
dissatisfaction but because of no change behavior must call back
and "harass"; or even a person/therapist/police officer
attempting to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the
person does not harm herself.
Bolles,

The first Amendment is made of "sterner stuff."
P.2d at 83.

The people of Utah must not live in continual fear

that something they say over the telephone with intent to
"annoy", "harass", "offend ", or "alarm" the listener will invoke
the statute.

Free speech may best fulfill its high purpose when

it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
present conditions or even stirs people to anger.
Louisiana,

Cox

v.

379 U.S. 536, 551-52, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462-63, 13 L.Ed.2d

471 (1965).
Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and
substantial interest in protecting its residents from fear and
abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment
others.

United

1978); Klick,

States

v.

573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir.

Lampley,

362 N.E.2d at 331.

The State also has a legitimate

interest in protecting the privacy of its residents' homes from
the intrusion of unwanted and perverse phone calls.
Everett

v. Moore,

City

of

683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these
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interests sweep to broadly.

Clearly, the legislature failed in

its duty to employ the least drastic means available to achieve
these purposes.

Shelton

v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct.

247, 252, 5 L.Ea.2d 231 (1960).
First of all, Utah's telephone harassment statute is not
limited to intrusions into the home.

Furthermore, it is not

limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an
essentially intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution
when the government seeks to "shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it."

Cohen

v.

California,

403 U.S.

15, 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971).

Plainly, the

statute lacks the "precision of regulation" required by a statute
NAACP v.

"so closely touching our most precious freedoms."
Button,

371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d (405)

(1963).

Thus, the deterrent effect of the statute on legitimate

speech is both real and substantial.
2.

Narrowing Judicial Construction.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the State's courts.

While Utah courts

favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent
and avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a
statute or ignore its plain intent.

Provo

768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake
1259, 1262 (Ut, Ct. App. 1997); Logan
Page 12

City

City

City
v.

Corp.
v.

v.

Lopez,

Ruber,

Willden,
935 P.2d

786 P.2d

1372, 1377 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).

One may argue that the statue

should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone calls made "with
intent to annoy, alarm ... or frighten any person ...," but only
when made for no lawful purpose.

While such a narrowing

construction of the statute may eliminate some of its
constitutional inadequacies, it is clear that the legislature did
not intend to qualify the statute in that manner.
statute was amended to delete
lawful communications/'

In 1994, the

the words "without purpose of

Hence, narrowly construing the statute

to apply only in situations where the phone call was made for now
lawful purpose would do "impermissible violence to the clear
language of the ordinance/7 Willden,

768 P.2d at 458, and would

be contrary to the legislature's plain intent.
3.

Examples of Overbroad Telephone Harassment Statutes:

Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at
issue here to be unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth.
E.g.,

People

People,
Moore,

v.

Klick,

362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles

541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City
683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).

of Everett

v.
v.

The language of these

statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the
narrowly tailored telephone harassment statutes that were upheld
in Iowa

v.

Municipality
and Arizona

Jaeger,

249 N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977), Jones

of Anchorage,
v.

Hagen,

v.

754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988),

558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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Similar to Utah's statute, these statutes specified the intent
with which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's
statute, these valid statutes also specify the nature of the
speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd, profane, and
threatening).4

The categories of language prohibited by these

statues are consistent with those held to be unprotected by the
Constitution in Chaplinsky

v.

New Hampshire,

62, S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed.1031 (1942).

315 U.S. 568, 572,
Subsections 1(a) and

(b) of Utah's telephone harassment statute, on the other hand,
make no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited.

As

in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b) directly apply.
C.

Vagueness

If this Court determines that Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201
is unconstitutionally overbroad, it may be held facially invalid
and this Court need not even address the vagueness challenge.
However, if the overbreadth challenge fails then this Court
should next examine the facial vagueness challenge.
v.

Ruber,

Logan

City

786 P.2d 1372, 1375, 1377 n.13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).

Virtually every potentially vague term used in Utah's
telephone harassment statute has been challenged in one State or
another.

The court's decisions have been anything but

4

The statues upheld in Jaeger and Hagen read as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another
and use obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threat to in
flict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person " (emphasis added).
Page 14

consistent.b

Usually, however, statutes containing similarly

vague terms such as "anno/' and "alarm" or "lewd" and "profane"
are upheld by the courts.

This is largely due to the clarifying

effects of other statutory elements or because of the willingness
of courts to impose narrowing judicial constructions on the
terms; the survival of the statutes can hardly be attributed to
the precision of the terms themselves.

Constitutionally
Statutory

Regulating

Precision,

The Case of State

M. Sean Royall,

Telephone Harassment:

An Exercise

in

56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1412 (Fall 1989).
v.

L.G.W.,

641 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982), is an

example of the Utah Supreme Court applying such a narrowing
construction on the term "lewdness" to avoid its inherent
vagueness.
While there is no hard and fast rule indicating which words
are vague and which ones are not, one may look to the purposes of
the vagueness doctrine to determine whether the terms used in the
statute at hand are indeed vague.

The vagueness doctrine

declares a law unconstitutional if persons " A of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application.' " U.S.

v.

Lanier,

s

U.S.

, 117 S.

Compare, e.g., State v. Sanderson, 575 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), City of
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), and People v. Norman, 703 P.2d
1261, 1266 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (statues containing the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys"
were found void for vagueness; with Kinney v. State. 404 N.E. 2d 49, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and
Donley v. City of Mountain Brook, 429 S.2d 603, 611 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) (upholding two
nearly identical statutes).
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Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connally
General

Construction

Co.,

70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)).

v.

269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127,

The doctrine reflects the principle that

no person should be held criminally responsible for conduct whic
Lanier,

he could not reasonably understand to be forbidden.
S. Ct. at 1225.
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The reasons for the doctrine are three fold.

Two of those reasons address Fourteenth Amendment due process
concerns and the third addresses First amendment interests:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them . . . .
Third, but
related, where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas o
basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the
exercise of those freedoms.
Grayned

v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S. Ct. 229

2298-99-33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972); See

West

Valley

City

v.

Streeter,

849 P.2d 613, 615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).
With regard to the First Amendment vagueness concerns, the
Supreme Court has intimated that "'stricter standards of
permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute
having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the
less be required to act at his peril here, because the free
dissemination of ideas may be the loser/'

Smith

v.

California,

361 U.S. 147, 151, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217-18, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1960).
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 prohibits an actor from using
a telephone to "annoy, alarm another, intimidate, offend, abuse,
threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . ."

Consequently, a caller

could be prosecuted for espousing Catholic doctrine that offends
a Mormon recipient, or for frightening a child at the called
number who might overhear [e.g., through a speaker phone] a
discussion of frightening scenes from Hannibal,

or alarm a

neighbor by informing him about a proposed property tax increase,
or harass a friend by suggesting he will be whipped at the next
game of pick-up neighborhood basketball, and so on, and so on,
and so on ....

The all encompassing language of the statute's

specific intent provisions does not put one on adequate notice of
when the content of a single call might be prohibited.

When can

one probe religious doctrine before the recipient is offended
such that the call becomes criminal?

Is it a crime if a child at

the called number is frightened by a discussion of one's war
experience?

How does a caller know where to draw the line when

calling about political topics which might alarm the listener"
This statute simply does not provide one with a fair and
understandable warning of when a crime will occur and how to
avoid committing it.
The vagueness doctrine also exists to prevent arbitrary law
enforcement and to prevent the inhibition of First Amendment

Page 17

freedoms.

In fact, the requirement that a legislature establish

clear guidelines to govern law enforcement is more important that
providing fair notice.

Kolender

v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 357-58,

103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); See Greenwood
City

of

North

Salt

Lake,

817 P.2d 716, 819 (Utah 1991).

v.

The lack

of clear guidelines in the telephone harassment statute
(ordinance) gives law enforcement unbounded discretion to apply
the vague law selectively and also subjects the exercise of free
speech to an unascertainable standard.

Kramer

v. Price,

712 F.2d

174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) .
Lastly, because they may not know what exactly it means to
''annoy", "harass", " alarm", or "offend" another, citizens of Utah
may inhibit their speech to avoid the risk of being victimized by
arbitrary law enforcement.

Since a statute that is capable of

reaching First Amendment freedoms demands a greater degree of
specificity than in other contexts, the statute should be
stricken on vagueness grounds.

Smith,

361 U.S. at 151, 80 S. Ct.

at 217-18.
If this Court determines that the statute is facially vague,
it may cure the statute's vagueness by instructing the jury in a
way that sufficiently limits the meaning of the statute.
712 F.2d at 178, n. 6.

Kramer,

For example, the court may clearly define

for the jury what it means to "annoy", "harass", "alarm", or to
"offend" another and precisely what "lewd" or "profane" language
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is.

In fact, a court is "obliged to seek to construe a criminal

statute to give specific content to terms that might otherwise be
unconstitutionally vague/'
(Utah 1982).

State

v. L.G.W.,

641 P.2d 127, 131

If the statute, as authoritatively construed by the

court, passes constitutional scrutiny then it will not be
overturned on vagueness grounds.

Chaplinsky

v.

New

Hampshire,

315 U.S. 568, 572-73, 62 S. Ct., 766, 769-770, 86 L.Ed.
(1942).

1031

However, as argued above, the terms "lewd",

"lascivious", and "profane", even if adequately defined for the
jury, have no application to the facts of this case.
Additionally, the terms "annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend"
are not susceptible to one comprehensive definition that fits all
factual settings but have different thresholds for different
persons in different settings.

For instance, loud and raucous

music may be acceptable at a rock concert or in the privacy of
some people's homes; but the same music may be offensive in other
people's homes or in funeral or religious settings.

"Annoy",

"harass", "alarm", and "offend" will likely have different
meanings to each member of a jury, notwithstanding the Court's
attempts at achieving defining instructions.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Thompson requests that this Court reverse the conviction
given the ruling of Provo

v.

Whatcott,
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finding Utah Code

Annotated

§76-9-201 to be unconstitutional.

Thompson has

standing to challenge the constitutionality of the telephone
harassment statute as applied to the facts of his case.

He also

has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on
its face.

The subject statute has a real and substantial

deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not
readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state's
courts; therefore, it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Additionally, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and cannot
be cured by a narrowing judicial construction by the state's
courts. Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be
stricken down because it violates the guarantees of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Article I,
Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah, and it cannot be applied
to defendant or anyone else.
DATED this ' ^ ^

day of February, 2001.

DANA M. FA
Counsel for Appellant
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